The National Guard, revolutionary armies and the centralisation of power during the French Revolution

Introduction

During the French Revolution, the right of citizens to bear arms became closely associated with popular sovereignty. The National Guard was intended to defend the Revolution and prevent the concentration of military power in the hands of the monarchy. Yet between 1790 and 1794, the revolutionary government increasingly restricted the autonomy of armed organisations and placed them under central authority.

This development raises a question that has received comparatively little attention in general accounts of Maximilien Robespierre: how did the revolutionary ideal of an armed citizenry relate to the growing centralisation of political and military power?

The answer requires a distinction between the National Guard, the revolutionary armies established in 1793, and the armed citizens organised within the Parisian sections. These institutions differed in their composition, responsibilities and command structures, although their activities sometimes overlapped.

The relationship between popular sovereignty and the revolutionary government changed considerably during these years. The process was neither straightforward nor necessarily the result of a coherent political programme. It developed amid war, domestic insurrection, food shortages and growing conflicts within the revolutionary movement.

1. Robespierre and the right to bear arms, 1790–1791

In December 1790, Robespierre published a speech on the organisation of the National Guard. Although he had not delivered it before the National Assembly, the text was printed and circulated. It set out his objections to restricting membership of the National Guard to citizens who met certain property or taxation requirements.

Robespierre argued that the defence of the nation was both a right and a duty of citizenship. Excluding the less wealthy from the National Guard would create a privileged armed class capable of dominating the remainder of the population.

He distinguished between the right of individuals to defend themselves and the right of citizens to defend their country. In his view, neither right could legitimately depend on wealth.

The argument had broader political implications. A standing army controlled by the executive represented one danger to liberty, but an exclusive National Guard might create another. The solution was to make the National Guard an institution of the entire nation rather than of a privileged minority.

Robespierre subsequently defended these principles during the constitutional debates of April 1791.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. XXI, pp. 238–250; add the parliamentary debates of 27–28 April 1791.]

This position did not mean that Robespierre rejected military organisation or discipline. Rather, he sought to reconcile military necessity with civic equality and the principle that armed force should remain subordinate to the nation.

[DISCUSS: To what extent did Robespierre draw directly on Rousseau’s conception of popular sovereignty, and where did he depart from it?]

2. The National Guard and popular mobilisation, 1792–1793

The overthrow of the monarchy on 10 August 1792 transformed the political circumstances in which the National Guard operated. The Parisian sections played an increasingly important role in revolutionary politics, while the distinction between active and passive citizenship lost much of its earlier significance.

The National Guard was not, however, a politically homogeneous organisation. Its officers, battalions and local units responded differently to the changing revolutionary situation.

During the insurrection of 31 May–2 June 1793, François Hanriot emerged as a central figure in the mobilisation of the armed forces of Paris. The confrontation culminated in the removal of leading Girondin deputies from the National Convention.

[SOURCE: Verify Hanriot’s appointment, the composition of the forces involved and the chronology of 31 May–2 June.]

The episode illustrated a fundamental problem for the revolutionary government. Armed citizens could defend the Revolution, but their intervention could also place the representative assembly under direct pressure.

The question was no longer simply who had the right to bear arms. Increasingly, it concerned who had the authority to mobilise armed citizens and determine the political purposes for which they might be deployed.

3. The creation of the Revolutionary Army, September 1793

The establishment of a revolutionary armed force in Paris in September 1793 marked another stage in the organisation of revolutionary power.

On 5 September, the National Convention adopted a decree providing for a force of 6,000 men and 1,200 artillerymen, paid by the public treasury. Its responsibilities included enforcing revolutionary legislation, suppressing counter-revolutionary activity and protecting food supplies.

The force was to be organised in cooperation with the Paris municipality, the commander of the National Guard and representatives of the Committee of Public Safety.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. LXXIII, p. 425.]

Unlike the ordinary National Guard, this was a paid force with particular responsibilities for implementing revolutionary measures. Its existence reflected the government’s dependence on organised armed intervention at a time of severe internal and external pressure.

Charles-Philippe Ronsin subsequently became its commander.

[CHECK: His appointment, the organisation of the provincial revolutionary forces and the relationship between the Revolutionary Army and the National Guard require separate documentation.]

The creation of the Revolutionary Army also increased the possibility of conflict between different authorities claiming to act in the name of the Revolution.

4. December 1793: the centralisation of revolutionary government

The law of 14 Frimaire Year II (4 December 1793) reorganised the revolutionary government and established a more clearly defined administrative hierarchy.

Introduced by Billaud-Varenne on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, the legislation declared the National Convention to be the sole centre directing the government. Public authorities were placed under the supervision of the Committee of Public Safety or the Committee of General Security, according to their responsibilities.

The law also regulated the publication and execution of legislation and strengthened the control exercised over local administrations.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. LXXX, pp. 629–637.]

The measure was intended to improve coordination and establish governmental authority throughout the Republic. It also restricted the independence of local revolutionary institutions.

The implications for armed organisations were particularly important. The central government could not establish effective authority while independent revolutionary forces claimed the right to act on behalf of the people.

[CHECK: The measure reportedly adopted on 7 December, requiring the dissolution of unauthorised provincial revolutionary armies within twenty-four hours, needs to be established from the original decree. The forces authorised by the Convention must be distinguished from locally organised units.]

This distinction is essential. December 1793 did not mark the abolition of the National Guard, nor the immediate disappearance of the Revolutionary Army in Paris. Instead, it represented an important step towards placing revolutionary institutions under more direct central supervision.

The law also coincided with growing political disagreements over dechristianisation, the treatment of suspects and the limits of revolutionary repression.

On 17 December, the Convention ordered the arrest of Ronsin, François-Nicolas Vincent and Maillard, known as Tapedru, during the struggle involving the supporters and opponents of the Hébertist movement.

[SOURCE: Add the decree of 17 December and contemporary accounts of the ensuing reactions.]

These developments suggest that the reorganisation of government cannot be separated from the political conflicts within the revolutionary movement itself.

5. Robespierre’s theory of revolutionary government

On 25 December 1793 (5 Nivôse Year II), Robespierre presented his Report on the Principles of Revolutionary Government on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety.

He distinguished between constitutional government, whose purpose was to preserve an established republic, and revolutionary government, whose task was to secure the Republic’s existence.

The distinction was important. Robespierre maintained that the extraordinary circumstances of war and internal conspiracy required methods different from those appropriate to a stable constitutional order.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. LXXXII, pp. 299–303.]

The report defended the centralisation of revolutionary authority while warning against both excessive severity and political weakness.

The speech should also be considered in the context of the conflicts involving Camille Desmoulins, Georges Danton and the Hébertists. Desmoulins had begun publishing Le Vieux Cordelier earlier in December, and his criticism increasingly raised questions about the use of revolutionary repression.

[SOURCE: Compare the successive issues of Le Vieux Cordelier with the proceedings of the Jacobin Club in December 1793 and January 1794.]

The tension between revolutionary necessity and political liberty was not new. What had changed was the concentration of the means of enforcement in the hands of the revolutionary government.

[DISCUSS: Did Robespierre’s defence of revolutionary government represent a departure from his earlier position on civic equality and popular sovereignty, or an attempt to preserve those principles under exceptional circumstances?]

6. January–March 1794: the weakening of autonomous revolutionary forces

During the opening months of 1794, disagreements within the revolutionary movement became increasingly pronounced.

The controversy surrounding Desmoulins and his appeals for clemency raised questions about the treatment of political suspects. At the same time, the Hébertists and their allies remained influential within sections of the Parisian revolutionary movement.

[SOURCE: Reconstruct the sequence of meetings and debates in January 1794. Particular attention should be paid to the Jacobin Club, the Cordeliers and the Paris Commune.]

Following the arrest and execution of Hébert, Ronsin, Vincent and their associates in March 1794, the position of the Revolutionary Army became untenable.

On 27 March (7 Germinal Year II), Barère presented a report on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety. He acknowledged that the Revolutionary Army had performed useful services, including the protection of food supplies and the suppression of disturbances, but argued that its commanders had also been responsible for abuses.

The Convention decreed its dissolution. Volunteers were allowed to return home or enter the regular armed forces individually. The Parisian artillery attached to the Revolutionary Army was retained for extraordinary service, subject to the authority of the Committee of Public Safety.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. LXXXVII, pp. 486–488.]

The decree distinguished the conduct of the soldiers from that of their commanders. Its purpose was not simply to punish the rank and file but to eliminate an organisation whose political independence had become increasingly problematic.

The Revolutionary Army disappeared as a separate institution. The National Guard, however, continued to exist.

That distinction is crucial to understanding the developments that followed.

7. The National Guard and the fall of Robespierre

On 9 Thermidor Year II (27 July 1794), the confrontation between Robespierre and his opponents in the Convention developed into a struggle over the authority of the Parisian armed forces.

François Hanriot, commander of the Paris National Guard, attempted to mobilise support for the Commune and the arrested deputies. Yet the response of the Parisian sections and their armed battalions was far from uniform.

The National Convention acted against the command structure of the Guard. A decree presented by Barère abolished all ranks and commands above that of chef de légion, thereby depriving Hanriot of the institutional basis of his authority.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. XCIII, pp. 542–543.]

Another decree expressly forbade the forty-eight Parisian sections from obeying the rebellious municipality and called upon them to remain loyal to the Convention.

[SOURCE: Archives parlementaires, vol. XCIII, p. 564.]

The conflict was therefore fought not only through armed mobilisation but also through competing claims to legitimate authority.

The failure of the Commune to secure sufficient military support during the night of 9–10 Thermidor remains a central question.

Did the armed citizens of Paris refuse to defend Robespierre and the Commune? Were they prevented from acting effectively by conflicting orders and the disruption of their command structures? Or had several months of political conflict already weakened the relationship between the revolutionary government and the popular movement?

[CHECK: These alternatives must be examined through contemporary accounts of the Parisian sections, the Commune, the Convention and the National Guard. No single explanation should be assumed.]

Conclusion: from popular armament to centralised authority

Between 1790 and 1794, the relationship between armed citizens and revolutionary government underwent considerable change.

Robespierre’s original defence of the National Guard rested on the principle that the right to defend the nation should not belong to a privileged minority. Popular sovereignty required that the armed force should not become an independent power standing above the citizens.

By December 1793, however, revolutionary legislation increasingly subordinated local authorities and armed organisations to the central government. The dissolution of the Revolutionary Army in March 1794 further reduced the number of independent centres of armed revolutionary activity.

The events of Thermidor demonstrated that the question of military command and political legitimacy remained unresolved.

Yet these developments should not be confused with the general disarmament of the population. The distinction between possessing arms, belonging to an armed organisation and exercising independent political authority is fundamental.

[DISCUSS: A central question for further research is whether the measures adopted between December 1793 and March 1794 contributed to the failure of the Commune in July, or whether political divisions and the immediate decisions of 9 Thermidor provide a more convincing explanation.]

The history of the armed citizen during the French Revolution was therefore not simply a transition from liberty to repression. It was also a struggle over the relationship between popular sovereignty, representative government and the control of armed force.

Research draft — 11 November 2026. References and interpretations marked for further verification. Not yet intended as a finished publication.